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CASE NOTES

section 12 (b) (3) will prove silly and unwise, and demonstrate itself to
be the product of passion which seeks to suppress the voice of dissent.
But the Miller case made it manifestly clear that redress will not be found
in the courts. If any relief from the allegedly oppressive law is to be
forthcoming it will be through the process of the ballot box and the
pressures of public opinion.
Alan Sobel
CRIMINAL LAW-CHRONIC ALCOHOLISM AS A DEFENSE
TO PUBLIC INTOXICATION STATUTE
Defendant, Easter, was accused of violating a criminal public intoxication statute in the District of Columbia.' His defense was chronic alcoholism, and he presented evidence that he had been consuming alcoholic beverages intemperately for over thirty years and had been previously arrested for the same offense approximately seventy times. Easter was found
guilty in the trial court, and the conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 2 The United States Court of Appeals reversed, holding that chronic alcoholism, though not amounting to
insanity, is a defense to the crime of public intoxication. Easter v. District
of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The ruling that chronic alcoholism is a defense to the crime of public
intoxication represents a change from the still prevailing common law
which does not recognize chronic alcoholism not amounting to insanity as
a defense. The only other jurisdiction which has adopted this view is the
Fourth Circuit in the case of Driver v. Hinnant,3 a habeas corpus proceeding involving the same issues. It will be the purpose of this note to trace the
development of intoxication as a defense to the crime of public intoxication
and to analyze the reasoning followed by the court in breaking with the
common law and the overwhelming majority of states. This paper will not
attempt to explore the legal ramifications of the possibility of extending the
defense.
Intoxication as a defense to a crime may be divided into three areas: (1)
involuntary intoxication, (2) voluntary intoxication and (3) chronic alcoholism. Involuntary intoxication has long been recognized, even at common law, as a defense to a crime.4 It has repeatedly been held that where
one becomes intoxicated without his consent, through the force or fraud
I D.C. CODE ANN. 25-128 (1961). "(a) No... person shall [in the District of Columbia]
be drunk or intoxicated in any street, alley, park, or parking."
2 Easter v. District of Columbia, 209 A.2d 625 (D.C. Ct, App. 1965).
3
4

356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).

Bartholomew v. People, 104 Ill. 601 (1882); Carter v. State, 12 Tex. 250 (1854);
Choate v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 169, 197 Pac. 1060 (1921).
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of another person, he is in a state of involuntary intoxication. This condition can be introduced as an affirmative defense to acts committed which
are a result of the intoxication. 5
On the other hand, it has also been a well recognized rule at common
law that voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for a crime. 6 However, where
the existence of some specific intent or malice is required, such intoxication, although voluntary, which suspends the individual's power of reasoning thereby rendering him incapable of forming that intent, may, even at
common law, excuse him of a crime provided the intent was not formed
before the intoxication. It has been held that such voluntary intoxication
may negative the specific intent required in cases such as murder,7 indecent
liberties with a minor,8 larceny," and burglary.' 0
Chronic alcoholism when not amounting to insanity" is still not recognized as a defense to any crime. In Choice v. Georgia,' 2 it was noted that
an inordinate thirst for liquor produced by the habit of drinking is no excuse legally or morally for the consequences of the appetite. 13 In another
leading case the court said that our law does not recognize dipsomania or
distinguish between an irresistible impulse for intoxicating drinks and a
mere inordinate appetite for them as a defense to a crime. 14 These holdings
are indicative of the attitude of the overwhelming number of jurisdictions
towards chronic alcoholism. These courts refuse to acknowledge the na• State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 435 (1870). See also ILL. Rsv.

STAT.

ch. 38, § 6-3 (1965).

"A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible

for conduct unless such condition either (b) [i]s involuntarily produced ... "
6 Rafferty v. People, 66 Il1. 118 (1872). See also Hopt v. Utah, 104 U.S. 631 (1881);
Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, 11 So. 250 (1892); People v. Freedman, 4 I11. 2d 414, 123
N.E.2d 317 (1954); Flanigan v. New York, 86 N.Y. 554 (1881)'.
7 People v. Trillman, 26 111. 2d 552, 187 N.E.2d 731 (1963).
8 People v. Klemann, 383 111.236, 48 N.E. 2d 957 (1943).
) Ryan v. United States, 26 App. D.C. 74 (D.C. Cir. 1905); Wood v. State, 34 Ark. 341
(1879).

10 State v. Koerner, 8 N.D. 292, 78 N.W. 981 (1899); Vickery v. State, 62 Tex. Crin.
Rep. 311, 137 S.W. 687 (1911). See also IL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, §6-3 (1965). "A person

who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for conduct
unless such condition either (a) [n]egatives the existence of a mental state which is
an element of the offense...."
11 "It should be noted here that insanity produced by chronic alcoholism is treated
the same as any other insanity." Beasley v. State, 50 Ala. 149 (1873); See also People v.
Cochran, 313 I11.508, 145 N.E. 207 (1924); Dawson v. State, 16 Ind. 428 (1861). See

People v. Hubert, 119 Cal. 216, 51 Pac. 329 (1897); State v. Kidwell, 62 W. Va. 466,
59 S.E. 494 (1907).
13

31 Ga. 424 (1860). See also Flanigan v. People, 86 N.Y. 554 (1881).
See supra note 12, at 424.

14

State v. Potts, 100 N.C. 457, 6 S.E. 657 (1888). However, in State v. Pike, supra

12

note 5, it was held proper to instruct the jury on dipsomania.
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ture of chronic alcoholism and the sociological impact that the illness has
created on our society.
The present decision recognizes the serious medical and..social problems
involved in chronic alcoholism and attempts to give them a legal application. As a social and medical problem chronic alcoholism is one of the
nation's most serious. It need only be pointed out that it is the fourth
largest public health problem in this country.' 5 Chronic alcoholism is now
almost universally recognized as a disease which leaves its victim unable to
control his drinking. In the Driver case the court discussed the medical aspects of the problem in detail and cited definitions by the American Medical Association, the National Council on Alcoholism and the World
Health Organization. 16 The definitions reveal that the chronic alcoholic
has no control over his drinking.
The social problem created by jailing chronic alcoholics for public intoxication has been criticized by numerous sources. Individuals are jailed
night after night in the "street cleaning operation" and confined in the
so-called "drunk-tanks" which are often poorly kept and unventilated
areas with no rehabilitative facilities whatever. Their contact with the
courts is often brief, and judges dole out meaningless lectures and penalties
to individuals who will almost surely return. 7 This method of handling
the victim has little or no preventative value as evidenced by the Driver
case where the defendant had been jailed for the offense more than 200
times.
At the time of Easter's arrest there was a lack of proper scientific rehabilitative facilities in the District of Columbia as is the case in almost all
jurisdictions. This was indicated by the court when it rejected the lack of
facilities as a justification for jailing the chronic alcoholic. This lack of rehabilitative facilities was especially important since the District of Columbia, recognizing the medical and social problem created by chronic alcoholics, had enacted a statute providing for the establishment of facilities for
15 Opening remarks by Secretary Celebrezze, Dep't of Health, Education, and
Welfare National Conference, 1963.
16 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 3, at 763. See also HEW, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE
(1965). See
Driver v. Hinnant, supra at 764 on alcoholism as a disease: "Of the myriad of authorities these citations will suffice: 2 CECIL & LOEB, A TExrBOOK OF MEDICINE, 162; (10th ed.
1959); MANFRED S. CuTTMACHER & HENRY WEINHOFER, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 318-22
(1952); JELLINEK, THE DISEASE CONCEPT OF ALCOHOLISM 41-44 (1960): "An illness or
symptom which numbers more than four million adults among its victims."
PUBLICATIONS, ALCOHOLISM National Institute of Mental Health, No. 730

17 PIrrMAN AND GORDON, REVOLVING DOOR: A STUDY OF THE CHRONIC POLICE CASE

INEBRIATE (1958); Mahoney, Discussion in PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL, ALCOHOLISM, AND CRIME 34; Murtagh, The Derelicts of Skid Row,
Atlantic Monthly, March, 1962, p. 77.
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the care and treatment of those afflicted with the disease.' Those facilities
had not been available to the defendant in the years intervening between
the enactment of the law and the present case. But the court held that this
fact did not detract from the legal effect of the provisions of the act which
defined the nature of the sickness. Under the act a chronic alcoholic has
committed no crime since the essential element of criminal intent is lacking
and, therefore, cannot be validly jailed merely because of a lack of these
facilities. 19
The rulings in the Driver and Easter decisions rest on two bases: (1)
that there is a lack of sufficient mental state to hold a chronic alcoholic
guilty of public intoxication and (2) that to do so would constitute a cruel
and unusual punishment violating the eighth 20 and fourteenth amend21
ments.
In the Easter case the court explained how the chronic alcoholic could
not have the mental state necessary for criminal responsibility. The chronic
alcoholic lacks an essential element of criminality, the criminal mind. The
court in the Driver case also emphasized the lack of intent of a chronic
alcoholic holding that a mens rea cannot exist since a chronic alcoholic
cannot refrain from becoming intoxicated. 22 The social and medical problems involved emphasize this lack of intent.
It has been contended that since chronic alcoholism originates from the
voluntary acts of the individual at some prior time, it is not necessary
to find an intent at the time of the subsequent violation of the statute prohibiting public intoxication. The court in the Easter case discarded this
argument holding that the original voluntary act of drinking which resulted in the chronic condition leading to his intoxication was not sufficient
to render his present condition voluntary. The court likened this to a sick
person who is sick because he exposed himself to the contagion of a disease.
Such a person is not voluntarily sick; a chronic alcoholic is not voluntarily
23
intoxicated.
Prosecution of the chronic alcoholic under a public intoxication statute
has also been justified on the theory that while the intoxication may be
involuntary the public exhibition of it is voluntary. The court rejected this
18 D.C. CODE § 24-501 (1961). One of its purposes is "to establish a program for the
rehabilitation of chronic alcoholics, promote temperance, and provide for the medical,
psychiatric, and other scientific treatment of chronic alcoholics."
19 Easter v. District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII: "nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."
21 U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, 5I: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ..
22 Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 3.
2a Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 19. at 54.
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contention by holding that, if this were so, the act would allow a person
to be sick in private but would punish the same person if he appeared in a
public place. The enforcement of the statute obviously does not take into
consideration that the very nature of the disease may lead the individual to
become intoxicated in a public place, 24 and it further causes confusion as
to the distinction between a public intoxication and a disorderly conduct
satute. Public intoxication statutes make it a crime merely to be intoxicated in public, 25 while disorderly conduct statutes punish public misconduct. One makes it a crime to be in a certain physical state, regardless of
either an intent to do wrong or the commission of an act harmful to society. The other punishes an individual for the commission of an act harmful
to society. When justifying chronic alcoholism as a defense to the crime
of public intoxication this distinction must be kept in mind. For instance,
the Chicago ordinance 26 is one dealing with disorderly conduct and not
specifically with public intoxication. Yet, it is not inconceivable that a
chronic alcoholic has been or will be prosecuted for disorderly conduct as
a result of being intoxicated in a public place. In such an instance the defendant should be permitted to plead chronic alcoholism as an affirmative
defense to the crime of disorderly conduct.
The possibility that the intoxication offense may be in the category of
offenses requiring no intent was also considered by the court. It has been
held that "intent to become intoxicated is not an element of the offense of
being found intoxicated. '27 The court in the Easter case declared that the
individual's misbehavior cannot be penalized as a malum prohibitum regulation obviating the requirement of an intent to do the crime which the
regulation punishes. The court expressly stated that "the alcoholic's pres-

ence in public is not his act for he did not will

it.'

'

28

The most persuasive justification for recognizing chronic alcoholism as a
prohibition against prosecutions for public intoxication contends that to
enforce the statute under such circumstances constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Proponents of this argument rely primarily on the authority
of Robinson v. California.29 In the Robinson case a California statute 0
made it a misdemeanor for any person to be addicted to the use of narcotics. In sustaining defendant's conviction the California courts construed the
statute as making the status of narcotic addiction a criminal offense for
which the offender may be prosecuted at any time before he reforms. It
24 Ibid.
26

CHICAGO, ILL.,

25 State v. White, 64 Vt. 372, 24 At. 250 (1892).
MUNICIPAL CODE

§§ 193-1 (1963).

27 State v. White, supra note 25, at 372, 24 Atl. at 250.
29370 U.S. 660 (1962).
§ 11721 (1955): "no person shall use, or be
under the influence of or be addicted to the use of narcotics...."
28

Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 19, at 54.

30 CALIFORNIA HALTH AND SAFETY CODE.
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was held that the statute inflicted a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. This holding demonstrated
that punishment for the state of narcotic addiction is cruel and unusual.
The defendant must have- committed some overt, antisocial act before a
crime is committed and criminal sanctions can be imposed.
When the Driver case3l was being considered by the district court, the
court pointed out that the North Carolina statute made "public drunkenness" a crime rather than the "status" of chronic alcoholism. 3 2 They thus
attempted to distinguish the North Carolina Act from the California Act
which made the "status" of narcotics addiction a crime. However, the Appellate Court in the Driver case, in reversing the lower court, held that
Robinson v. California "sustains, if not commands, the view we take....
The California statute criminally punishes a 'status'-drug addiction-involuntarily assumed; the North Carolina Act criminally punishes an involuntary symptom of a status. ' 33 The Easter court in adopting this wording added, "Since, as we have seen, public intoxication of a chronic alcoholic is not a crime, to convict one of it as though it were would also be
cruel and unusual punishment. '3 4 Further, the court cites Sweeney v.
United States35 where the decision of a board revoking the petitioner's
parole on the grounds that he had violated a condition prohibiting the use
of alcoholic beverages in any form was reversed when the court learned
that the parolee was a chronic alcoholic. The Sweeney decision relied upon
36
Robinson.
The decisions in Driver v. Hinnant and the case at bar are clear on the
narrow issue of public intoxication. The question arises as to the scope of
this doctrine's application. In the Driver case the court expressly restricted
its holding to chronic alcoholism as a defense to prosecutions for public
intoxication. 37 Judge Danaher, in his concurring opinion in the Easter case,
said: "I am confident that Congress ... had no thought whatever of addressing itself to some revised standards for determining criminal responsi8
bility as to yet other crimes than public drunkenness."'
These decisions set out the legal justifications, i.e. lack of intent on the
part of the chronic alcoholic and the cruel and unusual nature of the punishment, for recognizing chronic alcoholism as an affirmative defense to
prosecutions brought under public intoxication statutes. However, they
31

243 F. Supp. 95 (N.C. 1965).

33

Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 3, at 762.

32

Id. at 98.

34 Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 19, at 54.
35 353 F.2d 10 (7th Cir. 1965).
3T
38

36

Id. at 11.

Driver v. Hinnant, supra note 3, at 763.
Easter v. District of Columbia, supra note 19, at 61.
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also leave open the possibility that, because of the uncontrollable nature of
his drinking,- any. intoxication: of the chronic alcoholic will be treated as
involuntary, thereby possibly excusing a murder, a rape, or an assault and
battery committed under the influence of intoxicants. It remains to be seen
whether such an extended application of chronic alcoholism as a defense
will occur.

Glenn Chertkow
CRIMINAL LAW-COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL-RIGHT
TO ADEQUATE COMPENSATION
Five attorneys were appointed to defend four indigent prisoners, who
had been indicted for murdering three guards during a prison riot. The
trial was held approximately 150 miles from the attorneys' residences, and
they were forced by necessity to take up temporary residence in the
locale of the trial court for the duration of the trial. The attorneys sued
the county for compensation for their services and out-of-pocket expenses. The trial court found for the attorneys, but the county claimed
that there were no funds available with which to pay the attorneys. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and ordered the
State of Illinois to reimburse and compensate the attorneys. In dong so,
the Supreme Court ruled a state statute limiting compensation of the
appointed attorneys unconstitutional in the case at bar. People v. Randolph, 35 Ill.
2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966).
The Randolph case is significant because it is a case of first impression
which requires the state to bear the cost of criminal prosecutions, including
compensation and reimbursement for attorneys appointed as defense
counsel in such prosecutions. The purpose of this note is to analyze the
reasoning in the Randolph case by examining the precedents used, and
the constitutional and statutory provisions considered by the court in its
decision, and thereby show the developing recognition of the courts of
the practical needs for the implementing of the recent decisions of
3
Gideon v. Wainwright', Miranda v. Arizona2 , and Escobedo v. Illinois.

The Illinois Supreme Court's reasoning can be divided into four considerations: first, the duty of the judiciary to provide indigent defendants
with counsel; second, the inherent power of the court to regulate and
determine the obligations of the legal profession; third, the effect of
statutes limiting compensation of court appointed attorneys; and lastly,
how the court's order to compensate the attorneys can be executed.
The first consideration involves both constitutional and statutory provisions, and the tradition of the legal profession. The sixth amendment to
1 372

U.S. 335 (1963).

2384

U.S. 436 (1966).

3

378 U.S. 478 (1964).

